MORAL AUTONOMY: FICHTE’S ACCOUNT IN COMPARISON TO KANT’S

Odyssefs Diamantopoulos-Pantaleon

Research Paper

PH 4028A1 Kant and German Idealism

Dr. Elly Pirocacos

Deree – The American College of Greece

Spring 2021

Words: 3429

Abstract (123 Words):

In this paper we are going to analyze both Kant’s and Fichte’s theory of ethics, explore some of their key differences, present both of their views on moral autonomy and finally give my own opinion on the matter. In the first chapter we are going to analyze Kantian ethics. In the second chapter we will highlight some of the disagreements that Fichte had with Kant’s system and what did he like about it. In the third chapter there is going to be a presentation of Fichte’s system of ethics. In the fourth chapter, we will exhibit their views on moral autonomy through examples. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I am going to give my voice my own opinion regarding both theories.

INTRODUCTION

Ethics is a huge and extremely popular field in philosophy that examines moral behavior, moral concepts, such as justice, virtues and duty, and moral language. Ethical theories are trying to give satisfying answers to the question of “What is the greatest good?” and at the same time give a sufficient set of rules that can guide human behavior both individually and in an organized and civilized society. The origins of ethics can be tracked back to ancient literature, such as the Iliad and the Odyssey of Homer, that portrayed the set of values that a leader should have. However, an approach to ethics can also be found in ancient Greek philosophy that consciously tried to tackle the matter. Socrates, according to Plato’s Republic, believed that the greatest good is the “form of good itself”, which shines above the intelligible world. Aristotle also developed a theory of his own and claimed that the highest good is not good itself, but goodness embodied in human life and thus developed his virtue ethics. Furthermore, theories of ethics can be found in several religions, like the Christian and the ten commandments that accompanied it. Hence, we can reasonably infer that there has been a heated debate around ethics since ancient times and this is probably because of the implications that these moral laws can have in our lives. One of the most influential attempts to create an organized system of ethics can be found in the works of Immanuel Kant who tried to find the foundational principle of morality. Kant’s revolutionary ideas influenced philosophers even in his times and urged them to create their own theories regarding ethics and other fields.[[1]](#footnote-1) One of those philosophers was Johann Gottlieb Fichte who claimed that freedom plays a central role to morality and that each one of us is a responsible moral agent that interacts with this world. His works were accused of atheism and he was forced to resign as a professor in Jena because of these, but nevertheless he created a new System of ethics that gives an extremely interesting account to moral autonomy and its implications[[2]](#footnote-2). This paper is going to provide a brief summary of Kantian ethics in order to compare them to Fichte’s beliefs and see how they influenced his work. Moreover, it is going to present Fichte’s account of ethics, show their real-world implications and finally give my personal view on the matter.

KANTIAN ETHICS

Kant is one of the most influential and controversial philosophers of history and Kantian ethics are just a part of his huge contribution to philosophy. As mentioned above, the most basic goal of Kant’s ethical philosophy was to find a foundational principle of a “metaphysics of morals”. The first thing that Kant emphasized are the notions of good will and duty. For Kant, the only thing that is good without any qualification is a good will. More specifically, he argued that what makes a person good is that will that makes its decisions based on what he thinks is morally worthy, in other words the moral law.[[3]](#footnote-3) Furthermore, the good will must be good in itself and its decisions are determined by that moral law. According to Kant, humans inevitably experience these laws as something that constraints their natural desires and therefore such laws are called imperatives or duties. These duties are being executed purely because of respect to the moral law.[[4]](#footnote-4) For example, when I do my duty of paying my taxes, I simply do it because I respect the code that defines it as my duty. This analysis of good will and duty made Kant realize that as long as morality is not a mirage, human agents are indeed free and autonomous. At the same time, though, he had claimed that if causal determinism exists, then there is no room for the kind of freedom that morality presented us. [[5]](#footnote-5)In order to resolve this problem, he made the distinction between phenomena, which are the things that we come to know via experience, and the noumena, that are what we think but we can never come to know through experience. [[6]](#footnote-6)He then claimed that our knowledge can only stem from the empirical world and this knowledge is limited by our own cognitive powers. Moreover, this lack of perceptual powers does not allow us to fully understand the noumena or, in other words, the things in themselves. [[7]](#footnote-7)Additionally, Kant, refused the possibility of alternative conceptual frameworks, since the noumena are the same even if we cannot fully grasp them[[8]](#footnote-8). This distinction helped Kant solve the previous problem and allowed him to claim that “morality thus presupposes that agents, in an incomprehensible “intelligible world,” are able to make things happen by their own free choices in a “sensible world” in which causal determinism is true”.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Kant’s other goal regarding morality was to identify the nature and the extent of the moral duties that apply to humans. In other words, he sought the answers to the question of “What ought I do?”. [[10]](#footnote-10)In order to find these answers, Kant decided to create a formula that would allow us to understand if our choice is moral. To evaluate if a decision is moral, Kant argued that we must ask ourselves two questions. Firstly, can we rationally will that everyone act as we propose to act? Furthermore, does our action respect the goals of human beings rather than merely using them for our own purposes? [[11]](#footnote-11) If the answer to either of these questions is no, then Kant would argue that the action is immoral. More specifically, Kant conceived that there was a supreme principle of morality, and he referred to it as “The Categorical Imperative”. The CI is composed of commands that you have to accept unconditionally.[[12]](#footnote-12) For example, if the CI states that “you should not steal”, then even if you want to steal because it will benefit you, you may not steal. The CI’s connection to morality, according to Kant, is that morality is such that you are commanded by it and you cannot opt out of it, just like the CI. One of the formulations of the Categorical Imperative is the “Formula of Universal Law”.[[13]](#footnote-13) This formula states that you should "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law [of nature]"[[14]](#footnote-14) and in its own way defined the extent of moral duties that applied to humans.

FICHTE’S DISAGREEMENTS WITH KANT

Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s lived the same time period as Kant, 18th century, and his work was greatly influenced by the great German philosopher. To begin with, Fichte believed that Kant had introduced philosophers to many wonderful new concepts, but ultimately believed that his philosophy was fragmented and could not be made into a complete and unified system. That is why he took it upon himself to try and turn this system into a coherent one that would complete Kant’s philosophy. [[15]](#footnote-15)To understand why Fichte claimed that Kant’s system could not work we have to dwell deeper in their disagreements. For Kant, freedom was strongly connected to the human ability to follow the Categorical Imperative. Fichte took this idea and used it to fuel his own theory, but in a different way. For Fichte the idea of freedom played a central role to Kant’s system of ethics and it was the single presupposition of all experience. [[16]](#footnote-16)However, while Kant had limited his teleological speculations to the last of his books and work, Fichte believed that the concept of teleology was key to the concept of freedom. At the same time, while Kant was focusing only on the individual with the Critique of Pure Reason, Fichte desired something bigger and more inspirational, a theory that would possibly be able to cover humanity as a whole[[17]](#footnote-17). Furthermore, we mentioned in the previous paragraph that Kant refused to accept the possibility of “alternative conceptual frameworks”. However, for Fichte this was an outstanding discovery that was required for the notion of freedom. More specifically, he claimed that freedom can not only found in our actions, but in our thoughts too. Thus, there is no reason to think that we are limited to a single way of understanding the world, and there is no reason to believe in the one absolute external reality that Kant had described[[18]](#footnote-18). In order to reinforce this statement Fichte claimed that the noumenal world in itself does not contribute anything when it comes to knowledge, freedom or action, something that according to Solomon Kant had also conceded. [[19]](#footnote-19)Hence, the separation of phenomena and noumena is also rendered useless because there is no reason to separate knowledge and freedom.

Fichte had managed to trace the reason that explained why his view and Kant’s view were so different. According to him, the justification of us holding certain beliefs, can be found in the use that we have for such knowledge and how it affects our lives, or, in other words, they are dependent on our character. To put this into perspective, Fichte created two categories of philosophers, the Dogmatist and the Idealist. The dogmatist view, which was essential to science, believed that the human was an observer and a categorizer, while the Idealist claimed that humans are responsible moral agents[[20]](#footnote-20). Fichte believed that the Idealist view was by far superior, as expected, since for him freedom is the basis of all experience. Additionally, he claimed that the reason of all experience is to test our morality upon this world. [[21]](#footnote-21)This is another argument that stands against the absolute external reality of Kant, since it claims that the world is a stage upon which human agents act according to their morals. Thus, it is not the world that is absolute, but the self.[[22]](#footnote-22)

FICHTE’S SYSTEM OF ETHICS

It is essential to understand that Fichte distinguished his work on the moral law and his work on the theory of rights and of political society. For him, moral law is concerned with interior morality while the theory of rights and political society is concerned with relations between humans. He also claimed that moral law is not the initial source of rights and thus the theory of rights cannot possibly derive from moral law, hence the distinction. [[23]](#footnote-23)To begin with, Fichte firmly believes that it is possible for humans to know their moral nature in two ways. Firstly, it is evident on the level of common moral consciousness, which dictates to us what to do, and secondly, we can assume moral consciousness as something given to us and try to investigate its basis. The latter, according to Fichte, is the true goal of the science of ethics which can provide us with learned knowledge. [[24]](#footnote-24)However, it is not yet clear what we describe as moral nature. Fichte believes that there is a certain impulse inside the man to execute certain actions simply for the sake of executing them and this is precisely his moral nature. Furthermore, he claims that every human is an organized system of nature as well as a subject of consciousness and as a subject of consciousness the ego determines itself from itself and is striving for freedom. Therefore, a man has a natural impulse for satisfaction and a spiritual impulse that aims at complete freedom.[[25]](#footnote-25) Kant would claim that these impulses are different, just like how the phenomena are distinct from the noumena, but Fichte says otherwise. He argues that these impulses are one of the same and that consciousness is the dividing line between those two. To explain this concept, he identifies two types of freedom, formal and material freedom.[[26]](#footnote-26) Formal freedom requires only the presence of consciousness, while material freedom is shown by actions that try to achieve the ego’s complete independence. Moral life, as he explains, requires the constant swapping of those two freedoms and creates a spiritual concept of natural satisfaction. Fichte then proceeds and adds the notion of the law of self-determination.[[27]](#footnote-27) As he explains this law and freedom are closely connected and interchangeable and this interchangeability is what constitutes the fundamental principle of morality. The principle states that when one thinks himself as free, he is compelled to think that the law has impact on his freedom and that this law of self-determination admits to no exceptions, because it is part of his nature.[[28]](#footnote-28)

Across Fichte’s work, conscience has been always portrayed as extremely important. The reason that he treasures it, is because it plays a central role in his search of finding an absolute criterion of right and wrong. Fichte believes that conscience is defined as the immediate awareness of a certain duty, in other words, he considers it as an immediate feeling. [[29]](#footnote-29)It expresses the agreement of our empirical ego and our pure ego, where empirical ego expresses our natural need of satisfaction and pure ego relates to our true being, hence why this immediate feeling cannot possible be mistaken.[[30]](#footnote-30) Fichte notes, however, that our empirical ego might not be allowed to thoroughly connect with my pure ego and then immoral actions may be produced. All these claims rightfully put our conscience as the supreme judge and the unerring guide of our practical moral life, according to Fichte. [[31]](#footnote-31)

A final notion that Fichte wanted to touch was the notion of the absolute ego or infinite will. Fichte argued that conscience, as previously mentioned, is the guide of an individual’s moral calling which is made up of countless particular duties. Therefore, each one of us has his own personal moral contribution.[[32]](#footnote-32) From our point of view, the absolute ego aims towards perfect consciousness and self- possession but as self-consciousness has to take the form of a finite self-conscience, the infinite will also has to take form through finite wills[[33]](#footnote-33). A finite will, though, supposes a finite ego which in turn supposes a non-ego that it can reflect upon. These egos and their actions also require a world unto which they can perform. Thus, the absolute ego must posit nature and thus nature is just a condition for the expression of moral will. [[34]](#footnote-34)As previously mentioned, the thing that is absolute is not the world, but the self.

MORAL AUTONOMY FOR FICHTE AND KANT

In the previously 3 sections, we tried to give a brief but thorough account of Fichte’s and Kant’s view on ethics. In this section we will try to infer and understand their view on moral autonomy. From Kant’s statements we can understand that he believed that we are morally autonomous and that we have the right to take any action that we wish, as long as that action can coexist with the freedom of every other person in accordance with the formula of the universal law. In other words, every time that we are thinking about an action, Kant deemed that we are capable of deciding whether that action is moral or not, without the need of someone else to interfere and decide for us. However, we have to decide what is moral based on the Categorical Imperative and the Formula of Universal Law. For example, if we had to decide whether lying to a child about the death of someone is moral, Kant states that we are able to decide on our own on the basis of the formula, which will prompt us to think what would happen if everyone lied. In this case we would probably conclude that society would collapse and thus our action of lying is immoral. Fichte also agrees that we are morally autonomous, but he differentiates himself on the way we choose if an action is moral. To put this into perspective, we should take a look at Fichte’s theory of rights and political science. In Fichte’s system of rights and political society he reminds us that when we become conscious of ourselves, we also become conscious of other people and that we need a community of egos in order for self-conscience to arise, in other words, intelligence is a system of rational beings[[35]](#footnote-35). Therefore, Fichte states that the principle of rule of right is to “Limit your freedom through the concept of the freedom of all other persons with whom you come into relation”. [[36]](#footnote-36)It is like a social contract where you have to respect the other non-egos. In order to understand it better, we can use the metaphor of a sphere that resembles our freedom. When there are multiple egos there are multiple spheres that in the case of an organized society overlap. What the theory of right states is that you should limit your own freedom so that it respects the other egos freedom. However, as previously mentioned, according to Fichte we have two egos that are one of the same but strive for different things. The pure ego strives for complete freedom and independence and the empirical ego wants self-satisfaction. Depending on if they are given the chance to click together, we may have a moral action. Also, there is a possibility that the guide, consciousness of duty, might disappear and an impulse of self-advantage might appear that is going to guide the individual to immoral actions[[37]](#footnote-37). From these two previous statements we [[38]](#footnote-38)can reasonably understand that Fichte’s moral autonomy demands a consensus of the empirical and pure ego and then we should decide if our action is moral based on if our freedom to act will hurt another ego’s freedom. For example, in the case that we are in the dilemma of presenting false property information to the state in order to have a lower tax, depending on if our egos click, we might take different actions. If they click, we will most likely present the real information and pay normally and since that does not hurt another ego’s freedom it should be considered moral, but if they do not, our guide will become self-advantage and we will “steal” from society. The latter action would be considered immoral since we are denying some other egos the chance to act in certain ways, we are limiting their freedom.

PERSONAL REMARKS

Now that we have sufficiently analyzed both Kant’s and Fichte’s system of ethics and we have seen their opinions on moral autonomy, I would like to state my own opinion on the matter. Kant’s views present a very strict system of morality that accepts that we are morally autonomous. However, it is not flexible when unusual circumstances appear. If we take the same example that we used earlier, we can understand that there might be some occasions that lying would not hurt anyone. The child that would be the receiver of the lie could benefit from it. Imagine trying to explain to a kid the death of his dear friend. Perhaps it would be better to explain to him that his friends’ parents had to leave for work in another country or town and they took him with them. It would certainly be less painful, and it would not be the end of the world. Kant’s system, however, would not allow it. On the other hand, Fichte’s system, would react different. Fichte also agreed that we are morally autonomous and emphasized that freedom is the presupposition of experience. As long as, we do not limit other freedoms, we are allowed to act. This principle is a lot more flexible than Kant’s and in the same example would allow a little lie like this to be considered moral. There is no limitation of freedom and it would probably be better for the child. With that being said, I appreciate Fichte’s system more than Kant’s even though Fichte’s principles can be difficult to grasp and fully understand. Absolute freedom of course comes with its dangers and certainly puts a lot of burden to the moral agent’s shoulders, but it is way better than being strictly commanded by stiff rules that do not take into consideration the circumstances.

CONCLUSION

All in all, in this paper we showed that ethics have been widely discussed since ancient times, and theories about ethics have made appearances both in literature and in organized philosophical systems. Additionally, we explored Fichte’s and Kant’s system of ethics and we tried to highlight some of their key differences that resulted into two different, yet similar in some ways, accounts. Furthermore, through their systems we exhibited their views on moral autonomy and introduced some examples in order to make their differences clearer. Finally, I was able to give my own opinion on the matter and explain why Fichte’s view is more attractive even though it can be difficult to understand.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

* Breazeale, Dan, "Johann Gottlieb Fichte", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/johann-fichte/>.
* Johnson, Robert and Adam Cureton, "Kant’s Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-moral/>.

Q1:&nbsp; Could I Rationally Act on My Maxim in the PSW?” KANTIAN ETHICS, www.csus.edu/indiv/g/gaskilld/ethics/kantian%20ethics.htm .

* Copleston, Frederick C. *A History of Philosophy*. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963.
* Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989.
* Rohlf, Michael, "Immanuel Kant", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/kant/>.

1. Rohlf, Michael, "Immanuel Kant", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/kant/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, et al. The System of Ethics : According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre. Cambridge University Press, 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Johnson, Robert and Adam Cureton, "Kant’s Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-moral/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Johnson, Robert and Adam Cureton, "Kant’s Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-moral/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Johnson, Robert and Adam Cureton, "Kant’s Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-moral/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Johnson, Robert and Adam Cureton, "Kant’s Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-moral/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Johnson, Robert and Adam Cureton, "Kant’s Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-moral/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Johnson, Robert and Adam Cureton, "Kant’s Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-moral/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. “Q1:&nbsp; Could I Rationally Act on My Maxim in the PSW?” KANTIAN ETHICS, www.csus.edu/indiv/g/gaskilld/ethics/kantian%20ethics.htm . [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. “Q1:&nbsp; Could I Rationally Act on My Maxim in the PSW?” KANTIAN ETHICS, www.csus.edu/indiv/g/gaskilld/ethics/kantian%20ethics.htm . [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. “Q1:&nbsp; Could I Rationally Act on My Maxim in the PSW?” KANTIAN ETHICS, www.csus.edu/indiv/g/gaskilld/ethics/kantian%20ethics.htm . [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Johnson, Robert and Adam Cureton, "Kant’s Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-moral/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989 page.49-50 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989 page.50 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989 page.50 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989 page.50 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989 page.50-51 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989 page.51 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989 page.51-52 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Solomon, Robert C. *Continental Philosophy since 1750*. Oxford University Press, 1989 page.52 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.59 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.60 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.61 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.62-63 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.64-65 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.65 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.66 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.67-68 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.68 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.68 [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.68-69 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.69 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.69 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page.70 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy. Volume 7, Fichte to Nietzsche /, Burns & Oates, 1963. page. 66-67 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. The two nature of the egos and the intelligence as a system of rational beings [↑](#footnote-ref-38)